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While European health care systems are mostly public and  similar  the contrast is large to the 
US health industry based to a large extent  in the market. Using competence bloc theory the 
industrial potential of Swedish and European health care is assessed and compared with US 
health industry. To get the the analysis properly framed  health industry is defined to include  
health insurance, health care and the supporting biotech, pharmaceutical and medical 
instrument industries.  
A gradually aging industrialized world makes wealthy customers demand the sophisticated 
life quality enhancing medical support new technology offers. The overwhelming influence of 
substitute customership in Europe, through politicians, social insurance, doctors etc.,  
however, holds back development through suppressing the preferences of the true customer 
(the patient), discouraging innovative product competition and entrepreneurship. The larger 
part of cost escalation in US health care can be attributed to quality improvements, and luxury 
health care has stimulated innovative product development.  
While Swedish health care so far has been a technological winner, commercial competence to 
become internationally competitive is lacking. It appears politically difficult to recognize that 
private for profit health care may be both more efficient and profitable than publicly run 
services. However, once competition for profit has been introduced public providers have to 
improve performance and the differences will disappear.  
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*  This paper is based on competence bloc theory as presented in G. Eliasson – Å. Eliasson (2002b) to evaluate 
the commercial potential of health care as an industry, based on a comparison of the public service sectors in 
Europe, notably in Sweden, with the more customer oriented and entrepreneurial health industry in the US. The 
paper draws on two earlier studies Eliasson (1997b) in Swedish and Eliasson G.-Å. Eliasson (1997).             
1.  The Health Care competence bloc defined 
Health care in all its manifestations is an extremely competence demanding service. Neither 
the product nor the production technology is well defined. The knowledge input is highly tacit 
and each service provided draws on multiple integrated technologies. We, therefore, find it 
natural to look at health care as an industry operating in a market and begin with defining the 
product and its customers. For this industrial study we use the analytical tool of competence 
bloc theory (G. Eliasson – Å.Eliasson 1996, 2002). By comparing Swedish and US health 
care we examine the possible transformation of a regulated and price controlled public service 
into a dynamically competitive industry,
1 capable of producing the same, and more by less 
input. To assess the industrial potential of health care the selection and allocation of resources 
throughout the entire health services competence bloc are studied. 
 
Competence bloc analysis starts from the demand side by defining the product and its 
customers. After that the industry capable of supplying that product can be defined. The 
dictum of competence bloc theory is that customer competence and willingness to pay set the 
limits of product quality developed. The demanded output is health. While the 20
th century 
witnessed a significant  extension of the average life length  of individuals, the technology of 
the 21
st century offers a significantly increased quality of life. The expression of a demand for 
a health service that produces that result is, however, obscured by the confused customer role 
in health care services, regulators, politicians, insurers, doctors, lawyers and other substitute 
customers interfering with the voices of the true customers, the patients.  
 
Health care industry is conventionally defined as (hospital) care and medical services, the 
pharmaceutical and the medical instrument industries and the part of biotechnology industry 
that supports pharmaceutical industry. An industrial systems analysis of health care, however, 
requires a much broader definition that reflects all inputs in the final health product 
demanded. We have added the laboratory equipment industry that supports biotechnology 
industry and also health insurance industry which structures the composition of demand for 
health services, being in Europe almost completely in the public domain. One also has to add 
the legal services industry (notably in the US) supporting the patient in disputes with 
insurance, substance and  care providers, and the regulators, the latter significantly reducing 
                                                 
1 Similarly to transforming a formerly planned economy into a market economy (Eliasson 1998).             
the scope of action of all actors in the industry.  The complexity of the correctly defined 
health industry is shown in Figure 1. The figure indicates the large number of different ways 
the health product can be composed to satisfy a particular demand. For that, however, both 
the customer and the product have to be well defined such that well defined health services 
contracts can be formulated, property rights to contracted commitments efficiently exercised 
and the right prices established. The more of this that can be achieved the better the market 
will become relative to Government regulation as a welfare provider in health industry. The 
details of Figure 1 in combination with the competence bloc filter of Table 1 also indicate that 
technology is only part of, and perhaps not the important factor in organizing an industry 
capable of delivering the demanded health product to the final customer.  
The competence bloc lists the minimum number of actors with tacit competences needed to 
expose each project to a maximum competent and varied evaluation These actors  (see Table 
1) contribute competence at different stages of the creation and selection process in 
supporting new establishment, forcing losers to exit and taking the winners on to industrial 
scale production. The outcome will be industrial growth through positive experimental 
selection, or the Schumpeterian creative destruction process of Table 2. Customer 
competence plays a critical role in this dynamic by setting the limits to the demand for quality 
and the wealthy industrial economies have a large competitive advantage in customer 
competence (Burenstam Linder 1961). The innovator comes up with new technical 
combinations, and the entrepreneur adds the commercial competence of identifying profitable 
innovations. Without own financial resources the entrepreneur depends on the competent 
evaluation by a venture capitalist to obtain reasonably priced financing. The terms for venture 
capital funding, however, also depend on the existence of deep and competent exit markets 
where venture capitalists can unload their investments without large risks. In venture capital 
and exit markets the US has a competitive advantage over Europe. Finally, when a winner has 
been identified, competent industrialists are needed to take the project to industrial scale 
production. Also here specialist competence is needed. Executive experience from traditional 
industry is rarely sufficient. 
 
Competence bloc theory (G. Eliasson – Å. Eliasson 1996, 2002b) provides a model for 
systematically integrating data and other information for a systemic understanding of the 
evolution of an entire industry. To assess the industrial potential of Swedish health care we,             
therefore, go through the entire competence bloc, constantly making comparisons with the 
US. We also observe that much of what can be said of Sweden can also be said of Europe.   
 
2.  The health care product and its customers 
Erik Höök (1962) observed that whether publicly or privately supplied  certain high quality 
services were  luxury commodities that were predominantly consumed in the rich industrial 
countries. This goes especially for health care and education, the demand for which tended to 
grow faster than in proportion to income.  
 
The ultimate end product of health care demanded by the customer is to be kept as healthy as 
possible for as long as possible, the ideal product being defined by the light bulb time profile, 
i.e.; constant quality of life until sudden death (Eliasson 1997b). The ideal health care 
contract is a commitment on the part of the provider to guarantee an agreed upon future state 
of health. We will use this definition of the product, even though almost all literature focuses 
on intermediate input definitions of health care, such as the provision of particular treatments. 
We should consequently expect the customer (the patient) and the high income customer in 
particular to prefer product quality improvement rather than a lower price for given services. 
Hence, competition among health care providers, if there is competition, should be 
characterized by innovative product competition, not by rationalization and more cost 
efficient production of given products.  
 
2.1. Substitute customership 
Due to limited knowledge, a deficient state of mind on the occasion of exercising demand, 
insurance practices, legal rules, and ethical codes, the preferences of the true customer (the 
patient) are not expected to be competently expressed in the market.  ”Substitute customers” 
step in to support the true customer in, or deprive him/her of his or her difficult choices. The 
health care competence bloc, hence, features a fragmented and confused composite of 
customers made up of the patient, the insurer, the hospital care provider (”the doctor"; see    
Figure 1), the regulator and of politicians and lawyers. Particularly interesting is the fact that 
several substitute customers also serve the dual roles of being factors of production. The 
public insurer (in most European countries) attends to the particular political ambitions of the 
Government which may run counter to the interests of large groups of patients. The doctors             
also interfere with their particular professional ethics. The substitute parties in this composite 
customer role, thus, do not always act as good agents for the true customers who, therefore, 
sometimes need an additional agent, a lawyer or a health consultant, to protect their rights 
through a legal process. Here the US and European systems differ radically. Both in the US 
and in Europe, but less so in the US the legal systems are also designed to prevent high 
income earners from buying preferential medical treatment and this, of course, also limits the 
use of the market to allocate resources in health care
2. In addition, the tough clinical testing 
and authorization requirements of new drugs and medical equipment to check for negative 
side effects is another form of substitute customership or ”insurance” that interferes with the 
free product choice of the patient. The insurance contract, furthermore, defines and limits the 
quality of health services received. 
      (Figure 1, Tables 1 and 2 in here). 
 
The sick patient needs double insurance; insurance for the incidence itself (health care 
financing) and insurance for breach of insurance contract and malpractice in care. Litigation 
is becoming an increasingly important part of health care also in Europe, even though the US 
leads in devoting resources to that process, notably when it comes to paying large damages 
that match the loss of life quality a maltreatment may lead to. As the analysis will show, 
increased use of litigation may be a positive side of the health care process. The providers of 
health services in most countries normally play a double role, both having a decisive 
influence on the type of services provided and covering part of the bill.  
 
The final product of health care has to be defined in terms of the success of correcting a 
health deficiency in an individual. The output of all industries (and technologies) in Figure 1 
then become  inputs into this extremely multidimensional end product. The absence of 
competition and a ”commercial spirit” among substitute customers as well as providers, 
however, tends to stimulate centralization and large scale production of standardized health 
services for a market the true customers of which demand variety. The role of substitute 
customers in covering up the preferences of patients, notably the insurer, is of such 
                                                 
2  The kidney exchange programs in the US offer an interesting principal example. Most states prohibit trade in 
organs for transplantation and the medical community appears firmly opposed to such trade. However, “ barter 
solutions” involving changed priority orderings in waiting lists for “cadaver kidneys” are allowed. Roth-
Sonmez-Unver (2003) demonstrate through simulations that by allowing pairing of one or more voluntary 
donors of kidneys  with rearranged priorities in the waiting lists for cadaver kidneys  immunological 
incompatibilities can be overcome and  welfare  significantly increased. So while money wealth cannot buy you             
fundamental importance in competence bloc analysis that considerable attention will be paid 
to them below. 
 
2.2  The insurance contract defines the product 
The ideal health care market would trade in commitments on the part of insurance and care 
providers to maintain  a predetermined level and quality of health of the individual, and some 
customers should be expected to ask for coverage for top of the line luxury or high 
technology service. The existence of an efficient such market, however, is precluded for four 
reasons. First, the level and quality of health cannot be easily defined and measured. Second, 
technological uncertainty associated with determining the potential health hazards of the 
individual and the treatment needed to correct insurable deficiencies as a rule cannot be 
reliably estimated. Third, adverse selection and moral hazard make it difficult to define the 
contracted commitments precisely. Fourth, ability to pay for the insurance and/or the care is 
not everywhere present. Hence, these markets have only developed partially. Some argue that, 
therefore, the solution should be socialized health care. The situation is, however, the reverse. 
The US with the most commercialized health care markets exhibits the boldest attempts to 
commitments in these respects and the reason may be the steep damages imposed for not 
supplying the contracted and/or the best practice product. It is, therefore, important to 
compare the various attempts to managed health care business in the US with the European 
socialized and nationally standardized health care systems. 
 
A large part of US health care is financed over public budgets (see Table 3) and through 
different subsidies to hospitals. However, charity by hospitals and/or outright legal 
requirements of hospitals to provide certain treatment, notably emergency care to uninsured 
people are also common. Mas-Canal (2001) identifies the problem nicely. She observes that, 
”in the past hospitals ( in the US) had been able to finance the social mission of providing 
charity care through a complex system of internal cross-subsidizing where privately insured 
patients were charged higher prices”. The emergence of a competitive health care industry 
during the last twenty years has created a more efficient, and in many ways qualitatively 
better health care service, but it has also (and this is part of the increased efficiency) (1) 
trimmed away the margins previously available for charity to the uninsured and (2) forced 
Government hospitals to take on charity care patients. This change, Mas-Canal demonstrates, 
                                                                                                                                                          
a medical favour, finding a voluntary donor can.             
has resulted in a negative health impact on the uninsured. Increased competition and the 
creation of a more business minded health care industry have brought costs into the open, and 
turned the charity and redistribution sides of health services into what it really is, a political 
issue. 
 
Overprescription, overmedication and overtreatment are  controversial and difficult issues. 
Before the Boskin report (see below) they were discussed as inflationary factors in the US. 
Many studies, however, demonstrate that prices and the behavior of health care providers 
respond to economic incentives and competition, and that the increased use of new 
technology both reduces risks and improves health outcomes. Overtreatment may, therefore, 
also be looked at as an added and demanded uncertainty reducing quality of health care.  
 
Obviously, the nature of the contract between the customer/consumer of health services and 
the provision of the same services matter critically for product quality. This principal 
observation is, however, cold comfort when it comes to formulating the same contract. The 
first problem derives directly from competence bloc theory; the multiple nature of the 
customer and the dichotomy between who pays and who receives the service. This makes the 
insurance contract very complicated. The second problem has to do with lack of knowledge of 
the production process when the product demanded is correctly specified; namely to keep the 
patient at a prespecified level of health. As a consequence practically all contracts are input, 
not output specified. However, even so, new technology offers tremendous opportunities to 
improve product quality in the sense of keeping patients in good shape. It must, therefore, be 
important for welfare that the insurance industry comes up with innovative and efficient 
contracts that support, not only the efficient and rapid introduction of new technology, but 
also insurance tailored to the varied demands of the customer. Such contracts have to 
recognize the complexity and the lack of knowledge of the two parties of the deal to agree on 
the right way to price the risks involved. In general, when neither product nor production 
process can be well specified the rational arrangement is not a standard contract but a 
negotiated (between the customer and the insurer) customized contract. This means that the 
risks are defined and apportioned ex- ante, and not classified ex- post when an incidence has 
occurred and the insured is in a disadvantageous situation. This is the exact opposite to the 
dominant mode of organization of sick insurance and health care, reflecting the political 
position in Europe that the individual patient/customer is too ignorant to be allowed to shop             
for health care services. His case, in the case of an incident, will be responsibly attended to 
ex- post by trusted authorities.  
 
 
2.3  Quality versus length of life  
Some patients might prefer a somewhat shorter life, if they could, and in exchange, benefit 
from a higher quality of life until death. Medical technology increasingly offers such 
innovative trade-offs moving the life profile closer to the ideal lamp bulb life profile; constant 
quality and sudden death. Life quality enhancing services are, however, costly and not 
available to all, even though they eventually become standard services with lower costs and 
available to most, at least in the wealthy industrial nations. In European countries with 
socialized health care offering standardized contracts and care being financed by taxes the 
individual has little say in these choices. Only the very rich can chip in private money to 
obtain special, high quality customized treatment. In fact, law and regulation prevent the 
Swedish patient altogether from recovering the cost for standard treatment covered by public 




In most European countries the true customer to medical services has been eliminated and 
replaced by a standard bureaucratic decision process or ad hoc decisions by a factor of 
production, the physicians. The doctor (and the hospital) represents a highly competent 
substitute customer when it comes to health care technology, but a doubtful substitute 
customer when it comes to representing the true preferences of the patient. For instance, the 
possibility that some patients may want to trade a better life for a shorter life may clash both 
with physicians’ ethics and insurance policies. A both private and social welfare reduction 
may be the result. Objecting to the common view that medical care has not contributed much 
to health Lichtenberg (1998, 202,2003), Lichtenstein-Virabhak (2002) and Cutler-McClellan 
(2001) show that the introduction of new and more efficient medical technologies and drugs 
not only reduces mortality and prolongs life. It also raises capacity to work and expected life 
income across all age groups and, hence, contributes to economic growth. And the outcome is 
                                                 
3 It is now (it was not some   years ago) possible to obtain that service in a private hospital, but then the patient 
has to pay all privately.  
             
cost efficient
4. The provision of costly intensive care during the last six months of life, on the 
other hand, is more controversial. It does not seem to increase survival rates following acute 
conditions, and people seem to prefer less, rather than more intensive treatment at that stage 
(Skinner and Wennberg 1998). Highly controversial is the so called medical care rationing by 
patient preference in the US, or to ”die with dignity” at a phase when more treatment offers 
only a marginal improvement in the probability of survival and is followed by an 
unacceptable decline in the quality of life (Singer and Lowy 1992, Byrne and Thompsen 
1997). With 60 percent of an individual’s life time medical expenditures borne in the last year 
of life, and 40 percent of these in the last month, there is a steep cost-efficiency trade off in 
taking one step further to reduce terminal medical expenditures associated with sharply 
declining quality of life by offering an earlier benefit, most simply in the form of lower health 
insurance fees, or more luxury, life quality enhancing treatment earlier in life. Taken together, 
the raising of quality of life through innovative improvement of health services products 
should be a high return investment proposition for a commercialised health care industry. 
 
The causal links between knowledge, health an income have long been a cause for concern 
among  economists. Do healthy individuals earn more income because they are healthy and 
therefore demand more education and health services, or can subsidized investments in 
education and health care be instrumental in making individuals better income earners? Using 
inheritance data Meer-Miller-Rosen (2003) conclude that the causal link rather runs from 
health to wealth
5. Wolfe-Haveman (2001), however, argue strongly that the single most 
important explanation of both health and income is education. Educated people tend to have 
better access to jobs, be more capable of coping with change, be healthier etc than  less 
educated people. Gruber-Madiran (2002) in their survey of the literature on health insurance 
and labor supply- a virtually empty research field before 1990- indirectly conclude that health 
services are a demanded consumption item rather than an investment in a future higher 
                                                 
4 On the surface the US  “war on cancer” declared by President Nixon in 1970 does not appear to have had much 
of an impact. The age-adjusted US mortality rate from all malignant cancers was more or less the same in 2000 
as it was in 1969. But this reading of the statistics is misleading argues Lichtenberg (2004). It is true that the 
incidence of cancer has increased but this is because of improved diagnostic procedures  and the decline in 
mortality from other causes, notably  cardiovascular disease. Given the higher incidence, mortality is down 
strongly and Lichtenberg can keep the hypothesis that the increased survival rates in various malignant cancers 
depended on the stocks of drugs administered for the various cancers. 
5 Rosen-Wu (2003), furthermore, add that households in poor health tend to avoid risky, but potentially more 
rewarding financial assets. Case (2001) also found that exogenous increases in income (unexpected pensions) 
among poor South African blacks were shared among members of large households to improve nutritional status 
of household members and indirectly their health.             
income. They observe, based on the typical US organization of health insurance through the 
employer that availability of health insurance through the job is a key factor in the decisions “ 
to work, to retire, to leave welfare and to switch jobs.” 
2.4  The aging customer 
The aging of the populations in industrial countries will raise health care costs . The US is, 
however, quite well off compared to countries such as Japan which according to some 
estimates might have almost 60 percent of its population at 65+ by 2050 (see NBER Reporter, 
Summer 1999, Gruber and Wise 1999, Gruber and Zinman 2001). Gruber and Wise conclude 
that the single most important long-run fiscal issue facing the developed world is the aging of 
its population. That same fact should, however, also create tremendous opportunities for the 
health industry in the rich industrial nations if it can refocus its product development on the 
raising of quality of life and ability to work at above retirement age. In terms of competence 
bloc theory this would shift focus towards the market and the customer and away from the 
fiscal problem.
6  Many studies also show a strong negative correlation between wealth and 
early death. The causality, however, appears to run from health to wealth rather than the other 




                                                 
6 Skinner and Wennberg (1998) also show that rapid growth in health care spending is concentrated to the 
young (less than 1 year-old) and the old (65 and older). Among the old circulatory disorders and neoplasms are 
the most common high cost diagnoses, and mortality has decreased dramatically over time as life quality has 
increased. Harding (1995) observed the same from Australian data. Cutler and Meara (1997) point to 
technological advance as the main factor behind the disproportionate increase in health care costs among these 
groups. Burger and Schneider (1995) demonstrate that a new drug for advanced Alzheimer patients covers its 
costs through a reduced need for care. Increased life quality for the patient and relatives comes as a free bonus. 
 
7 Interesting complications arise when medical cost-efficiency analyses take into account future costs for 
medical care when interventions increase the length of life rather than the quality of life (Meltzer 1997). A  large 
part of medical treatment is received during the last months of an individual’s life. Skinner and Wennberg 
(1998) observe that the use of intensive treatment in the last six months of life varies a lot between regions in the 
US and for no obvious (measurable) reasons, and despite the fact that people prefer less, rather than more 
intensive treatment. In sum, they conclude that regions providing more intensive care do not seem to gain any 
net health benefits over other regions and that allocative inefficiency may be present in the sense that patients 
are not matched with the treatment they prefer. Rather, intensive treatments seem to rise with the presence of 
particular specialists in the region. Excessive use of highly reimbursed treatment is a related problem. Gruber 
and Owing’s (1994) hypothesize that the varying decline in fertility in the US 1970-1982 induced 
obstetricians/gynecologists to substitute from normal childbirth towards more highly reimbursed cesarean 
delivery. Their results are significant and robust. 
 
             
Early retirement appears to be a characteristic of all industrial countries with a growing share 
of elderly in their populations. This is expected to put great strains on the financial solvency 
of retirement income systems around the world. One would also expect private and pension 
wealth to induce less healthy persons in particular to retire early. The explanation, however, 
rather appears to be disincentives to work built into the generosity of the social security 
systems in Europe in combination with a system that heavily ”taxes” continued work (NBER 
Reporter, Summer 1999, p. 91). On this Prescott (2004) concludes that the reasons Americans 
work 50 percent more than Europeans and generate a 40 percent higher per capita output are 
to be found in higher taxes in Europe and an elastic labor supply, creating an ugly 
intergenerational problem of how to pay for the excessive social and retirement benefits a 
large number of Europeans are living  on , that cannot be refinanced through higher taxes. 
Also, the standard forecasts that greater life expectancy will increase medical costs may not 
be true. First, since end-of-life costs generally decrease with age at death, a greater life 
expectancy will mean that a smaller share of  the elderly will die at ages when medical costs 
are at their maximum. Second, reductions in disability among the elderly also reduce medical 
spending. This is in keeping with success in moving towards the ”light bulb” health care 
product. The net effect should be a reduction of average medical spending on the elderly. 
However, this net reduction is not sufficient to significantly reduce the overall increase in 
medical spending projected. If this increase is largely a matter of quality advance in health 
care services (see below) that is also demanded by customers willing to pay, the overall effect 
should be a contribution to growth and a (large) welfare increase and nothing to be concerned 
about (Cutler and Sheiner 1998). The aging of the populations in the rich industrial countries 
could, therefore, be looked at as a business opportunity. If the markets for health care are 
well organized for firms to capture those opportunities the results could mean a positive  leap 
in welfare, notably for the elderly, and possibly also solve the problem of financially 
collapsing public retirement schemes in Europe. 
 
2.5. Demand induced technology advance 
 
Economists have long discussed the relative importance of demand induced innovation and 
technological or science push factors behind innovation. But there has been little empirical 
evidence to show. The thrust of competence bloc analysis is that technology push is not 
sufficient, and maybe not even that important. Other, economic factors may be decisive.             
Finkelstein (2003) have designed as unique study on the effect of (three) policy (health 
insurance) changes on incentives to invest in new vaccine developments in the US against six 
particular diseases. Finkelstein distinguishes between (1) static effects in terms of increased 
use of existing vaccines and (2) induced investments in “developing improved  versions of the 
existing vaccine (dynamic consequences)”.  She, furthermore, distinguishes between  five 
dynamic consequences; (1) spillovers, (2) reduced side effects, (3) the development of new 
and more efficient vaccines, (4) increased use of the improved vaccines and (5) increased 
vaccination “ for unaffected  diseases” but can only estimate the effects of  (3) and (4) and 
reports  “robust” evidence of an increase in vaccine  investment “ because of increased  
demand incentives”.  The response so measured, however, appears to be limited to late stage 
commercialisation investments (clinical trials) and not to a pre-clinical research aimed at  
developing “fundamentally new technologies”, but the results are still of principal interest, 
especially if coupled with a different  dimension of dynamics, namely the economic 
consequences of keeping people healthy and at work. . 
 
Differently designed health insurance also induce different hospital quality supply responses. 
Hospital investments in improved quality depends on the return hospitals receive on those 
investments.  Gowrisankaran-Town (2002) observe that competition among hospitals for 
patients  made privately produced  managed care or HMOs produce different quality offerings 
from hospitals than competition from  publicly purchased health care through the Medicare 




3.  Technology potential and innovations 
The health industry comprises many diverging technologies that integrate in different ways. 
The technological potential of health care, however, is not only a matter of applying state of 
the art technology on the patient, but of how different technologies are innovationally 
combined. Of particular importance are the possibilities to substitute technology for 
expensive care, for instance in the form of improved early diagnosis and preventive 
medication, through substituting medicines or efficient new medical devices that require no, 
or only a brief, stay at the hospital or through improving incentives to use total resources             
more efficiently. Here the role of the insurer as a representative and rational substitute 
customer for the patient is critical.  
 
 
3.1  Luxury health care needed for innovative product innovation 
Quality is the fundamental output of health care. Variety in services offered is a fundamental 
and costly part of product quality. Product quality depends critically on the quality of input 
factors, but also, and significantly on the incentives to be efficient and to use new technology. 
On both sides variety in supply is an important ingredient of quality.
8 The United States has 
the highest per capita health care expenditures in the world, and a health industry that is to a 
significant degree private and subjected to competition. It also stands out as a leader in the 
advancement of treatment technologies with – as we will see- also  (NBER Reporter, Summer 
1999, p. 6). The question is: Does this depend on the resources spent, on the organization of 
industry (private vs. public, for profit competition or regulation etc) or on something else? 
 
Health care in Sweden and England is primarily publicly provided. The rest of Europe has a 
higher private share, that is, however, still lower than the public share. The US spend almost 
as much (as a share of GNP) on publicly provided health care (1997 6.5 percent; see Table 3) 
as Sweden, but even more (or 7.5 percent) on private health care. This means significantly 
more per capita public care in money terms in the US than in Sweden. While the Swedish 
share has been significantly lowered since 1983 (from 9.5 to 7.2 percent) it has increased in 
the US (from 10.4 to almost 14 percent). Extensive health care of high quality is a luxury 
investment in life quality, primarily only available in the rich industrial economies. It will be 
increasingly demanded. Advanced, high cost health care in a wealthy country with many 
highly educated, experienced and competent individuals, furthermore, should be looked upon 
as a highly (socially) profitable investment in production (Bhargava, Jamison, Lau and 
Murray, 2000, Strauss and Thomas 1998). It is socially costly to keep these people outside 
production in terms of output lost (Lichtenberg 1998). 
      (Table 3 in about here)  
                                                 
8 as illustrated by Currie and Gruber(1997) who find that eligibility for coverage under the US medicaid 
program for teen mothers in combination with closeness to a hospital with a Neonatal Intensive Care Unit meant 
a sizable reduction in mortality of children. 
             
 
US experience suggests that the higher the health care cost share in GNP, and the higher the 
private part in that share, the larger the share of total costs that is devoted to raising life 
quality  and to preventive care rather than corrective treatment. The higher these shares the 
larger the innovative and exclusive technology content of the medical service provided. The 
reason is partly the luxury care allowed for in the diversified US health insurance system, but 
mostly the less regulated and more varied and, therefore, also more entrepreneurial health 
industry in the US than in Europe, characterized by innovative product competition. Clearly, 
growth in health care spending is largely driven by those at the top of the spending 
distribution (Cutler and Meara 1997).
9 Treatment that is costly and of a luxury nature today 
will, however, with time become standard treatment and generally available through 
technological development and experience. Obviously, customers willing   to pay for costly 
high-technology quality-increasing care are not only necessary for the existence of an 
industry providing these services. It is also a necessary requirement for the creation of the 
same new technology that later becomes standard treatment available to almost all at a 
reasonable cost. A group of rich customers, so to speak, pay for the development of new 
advanced technology through buying the associated health services. The larger that group, the 
faster the creation and diffusion of the same technologies. 
 
The conditions for the development of a sophisticated high-technology health care industry, 
therefore, are only good in a country in which the citizens are willing (and in practice 
allowed) to spend on luxury, quality-raising and customized medical treatment. A high 
private share is not only associated with high quality. A private, decentralized organization of 
health services is also congenial to the commercialisation and diffusion of innovations that 
arise spontaneously in the care part of the health industry. Health industry doesn’t differ from 
other forms of production when it comes to innovative product development. It also has to be 
experimental, and exclusively offered to the few to begin with. Hence (see Eliasson 1997b, p. 
38), the low private share of the health care industry in Sweden puts the transformation of the 
Swedish health care sector into a viable industry at risk.   
                                                 
9 The Medicare program in the US available to all above 65, in fact  appears to have been more beneficial to 
high income earners than to the poor because they live longer and use health care provisions more efficiently 
than low income families and the poor (McClellan and Skinner 1997). The expansion of Medicaid eligibility 
1984-1992, however, has substantially increased preventive care among the poor and significantly improved 
health outcomes, notably when it comes to infants and child mortality (Gruber 1996, 2000a, b). 
             
 
3.2  Cost explosion or quality advance – the US experience 
The observed ”cost explosion” and the slow measured productivity development in medical 
service provision have been interpreted – in the US in particular, but also in Europe – as a 
problem signalling the long-term impossibility of providing reasonably high quality services 
for the citizens. Statistics in the US, when adjusted for quality change are, however, rather 
consistent with a rapid increase in the supply of a demanded quality of health services.
10 
Improved quality in health services is to a large extent related to (innovative) variety in 
product development, that is costly, but that should be seen as more, not  more expensive 
health service. And innovative product development in health industry should be associated 
with significant spillovers (Eliasson 1997a) to the rest of the industry thus boosting the value 
of total industry output if properly measured. The general picture appears to be that real prices 
for medical care have not increased by far as much as was earlier believed. They may even 
have decreased, when compared with a general price index also corrected for quality 
change.
11 There is indeed a need for more adequately designed medical care price indexes 
(Berndt, Cutler, Frank, Griliches, Newhouse and Triplett 1998) that incorporate quality 
changes due to technical advance. This is exceptionally difficult for products (”treatments”), 
the benefits of which extend over a lifetime, that the patient may not be willing to pay for and 
that are (therefore) often being paid by a third party (Shapiro, Shapiro and Wilcox 1999
12). 
When constructing a quality-adjusted price index that reflects the entire treatment of one 
major illness (depression) rather than a fixed basket of goods and services, Berndt, Bush and 
Frank (1999) find that the real price of health care has fallen, rather than having increased 
substantially
13. For a number of well-defined treatments, the increased costs (in the US) have 
been found to correspond to a radically enhanced quality of services providing an improved 
quality of life. In fact, for many services (including surgery) the price has been lowered (see, 
                                                 
10 For a survey also see Eliasson (1997b).   
11 See Triplett 1999, Boskin, Dulberger, Gordon, Griliches and Jorgenson (1996, 1998). 
12 The producer price index, furthermore, appears to undersample younger and more competitive products and, 
hence, both overestimates price increases (Berndt, Griliches and Rosett 1992) and fails to reflect the welfare 
gains to customers who regard generic and branded versions of a drug as perfect substitutes (Griliches and 
Cockburn 1993). 
13 Part of the overestimation of price increase may occur because of a drift in price indexes caused by the 
introduction of new goods Berndt, Griliches and Rosett (1992) observed in an earlier study.             
for instance, Berndt, Bir, Busch, Frank and Normand 2000 and Triplett 1999).
14  Cutler, 
McClellan, Newhouse and Remler (1997) conclude that prices of medical care  may be 
declining, or at most, have risen only modestly in recent years (also see Triplett 1999). This 
result becomes stronger if also quality of life improvements (not only life length 
consequences) are factored in.
15 Then the index falls by 1 to 2 percent per year relative to 
general inflation (Cutler, McClellan, Newhouse and Remler 1999). Indeed, when the value of 
improved health is estimated, it is often found to exceed the increased cost, in this case of 
heart attack care (see Cutler and McClellan 1998 and Cutler, McClellan and Newhouse 
1998). After carefully evaluating the different factors involved and weighing in new evidence 
(after the Boskin report) Gordon (2000) concludes that the upward bias in the CPI for medical 
potential of health care services estimated by the Boskin report may even be an 
underestimate.  
  
The United States has the highest health care costs in the world (NBER’s  Reporter, Summer 
1999, p. 6). New technology and new drugs have dramatically improved the quality of life for 
people that earlier suffered from debilitating diseases.  The conclusion should, therefore, be 
that the long-run increase in health care expenditures in the US reflects an increased demand 
for quality of health services. 
16 
 
3.3 Personalized  medication 
The low accuracy of drugs, not more than 20 percent on the average, means that a significant 
number of patients will only experience cumulative negative side effects. New knowledge of 
the genome not only makes precise diagnoses available but also personalized medication that 
                                                 
14 For instance, Cutler and McClellan (1996) find that essentially all the growth in costs for the treatment of 
heart attacks can be attributed to the diffusion of intensive technologies, ”insurance generosity” being one 
important explanation to the diffusion. The price for a given quality-adjusted treatment has, in fact, been 
constant or falling. Cutler, McClellan and Newhouse (1998), studying the treatment of cardiovascular disease, 
conclude that the cost of living for heart attack victims is actually falling and that new medical treatment and 
intensive procedures (in that order) are the explanation. 
15 The value of one additional year of life can be estimated by  (1) asking people what they are willing to pay, 
(2) finding out how much higher pay they demand for an increase in job risks of injury or death and (3) 
observing how much they spend on safety devices. Consensus from literature (see Cutler et al., 1999) suggests 
the value to be (on the average) $100 000 and that an extra $ 25 000 should be added above the average for a 
year in perfect health. Lichtenberg (2004) puts the value of a statistical U.S. life –year  “ in the neighbourhood 
of $ 150,000 ”. 
16 Here Nordhaus (2002) argues that measures on health status are much better than output quality adjustments 
of particular medical technologies and proceed to correct US GNP data for improvements in human health that 
have so far gone unmeasured. He finds that “ the economic value of increases in longevity in the last hundred              
fits the patient’s genetic specification and, hence, raises the accuracy of medication and the 
possibilities of keeping people healthy and out of hospital. 
 
The five most promising product (therapeutic) areas in age related diseases for which an 
increased private demand should be expected appear to be: (1) diagnostics, genetic testing, (2) 
cardiovascular disease, (3) cancer of the breast and prostate, (4) other forms of cancer, and (5) 
neurodegenerative diseases (Alzheimer’s and Parkinson’s). These five product areas offer 
promising opportunities for advance in life quality enhancing product development and 
preventive medication that will also keep people at work longer. Product development in all 
areas is expected to be heavily supported by biotechnological advance. A careful look at each 
of these areas, however, reveals that the number of different technological approaches to each 
particular disease within each category is enormous.
17 While opportunities are great the risks 
of focusing on the wrong method are also large, so development will have to be an 
experimental flow of winners, the main cost of developing these substances being mistaken 
projects.  Two factors hold the realization of that technology below a feasible technical rate; 
badly designed costing and pricing systems in health insurance and care, notably in publicly 
run systems, and limited interest from the less innovative large scale pharmaceutical 
companies, that realize that personalized medicine will not – at least until threatening 
competitors show up – make earnings come as easily as before.  
 
4.  Entrepreneurship in the health industry 
Competence bloc theory emphasizes the critical role for industrial development of other 
factors than technology and other actors than innovators. If the competence bloc is not 
vertically complete and horizontally varied winners may be lost and winning technology may 
not lead to successful industrialization. Such required actors with competence are the 
entrepreneur (this section), the venture capitalist and the industrialist. 
 
The Swedish health industry is dominated by large, socially oriented and publicly financed 
and run hospitals embedded in a socialized health insurance system, and a few successful 
                                                                                                                                                          
years is about as large as the value of measured growth in non-.health goods and services”. 
17 Prostate cancer, for instance, is being approached using at least eight completely different technologies 
(Eliasson 1997c, pp. 6f); radical surgery, radiation therapy, cryosurgery, chemotherapy, diet, biotechnological 
diagnostics and early targeting methods, and photosensitive chemical targeting of cells.             
private medical instrument and pharmaceutical companies. There is also an increasing 
number of small private biotechnology start- ups around university campuses.  
 
Despite a long history of ”technical” interactions with the medical devices and equipment and 
pharmaceutical industries, explaining some of its commercial success stories, most of the 
public hospitals are still operated as large centralized administrative systems.  This has not 
been a good environment for entrepreneurship. Hospitals have also been reluctant to 
outsource care services, and their principal governing bodies, politically elected in Sweden, 
generally resist change towards privatization and fee based profit-oriented care provision. As 
late as July 2002 the ruling social democratic party of Sweden has taken a negative position 
on for-profit hospital care. Similar political sentiments prevail in much of Europe and 
apparently also in some quarters among the medical profession in the US (see below).  This 
blocking of commercialisation of the hospital care has been reinforced through the 
(socialized) health insurance schemes and price regulation that makes it difficult or 
impossible to get paid for innovative product development. Hence, an environment that 
discourages entrepreneurship has been created. 
 
The pharmaceutical success stories Pharmacia and Astra have now merged respectively with 
US UpJohn and Monsanto into Pharmacia Corp. to be acquired by US Pfizer in 2002  and 
with UK Zeneca into AstraZeneca (see below). They belong to the global giants and have 
begun to suffer the standard problems of lack of internal innovative new product 
development. In medical instruments the situation is different. Here (for instance) Swedish 
fine mechanical engineering prowess has merged successfully and commercially with medical 
know how. When close to existing Swedish manufacturing know how and ample industrial 
funding, entrepreneurship seems to work.  
 
Entrepreneurship in biotechnology is mixed. The Swedish start was early. In fact, Pharmacia 
was heralded in the early 1980s by the US venture capital community to be (together with 
Danish Novo) potential global winners in the budding biotechnology industry (Eliasson 
1997c). The history of both companies during the 1980s, however, was disappointing to the 
venture capital community. The Swedish biotechnology industry, despite its excellent 
academic foundation, has been lagging behind. The reorganization of, and closing down of 
(parts of) Pharmacia, however, appear to have released significant biotechnology and             
pharmaceutical management competence in the Uppsala area to start new and innovative 
firms and the long- term growth outlook in the Uppsala region may even be positive (Eliasson 
2004a,b). The cases of titanium implants in Sweden (Nobel BioCare) and in the US 
(AcroMed) are interesting. When two very similar and innovative technologies (Fridh 2000) 
were ”dropped into” two very different competence blocs the complete US competence bloc 
carried the innovation to industrial scale production and distribution five times as fast
18  as 
was the case in the incomplete competence bloc in Sweden where a badly functioning exit 
market finally has turned Nobel Biocare into a cheap acquisition for a Swiss company (BB 
Medtech). The judicial domicile of  Nobel BioCare has been be moved to Zürich for tax 
reasons, while its corporate headquarter remains in Gothenburg (Dagens Industri, April 10, 
2002).  
 
5.  Venture capital and exit markets 
While the Swedish industrial policy discussion has gone from a complete neglect of the role 
of the entrepreneur in economic growth until well into the 1980s to a concern about the lack 
of entrepreneurship in the 1990s, the real problem appears to have been lack of competent 
venture capitalists (Eliasson 1997c). Public financing, bank credits and big company ”venture 
finance” have been in fairly abundant supply since the 1970s, but availability of such finance 
has been mistakenly interpreted as availability of critical venture capital coupled with 
industrial competence. What has been lacking is the competence to identify winners and to 
understand their industrial potential and the capacity to offer funding at reasonable terms. 
Provision of financial resources for commercialization of new technology unrelated to 
existing big firms between the early research stage and industrialization has been almost 
nonexistent in Sweden for a long time. And the situation in Europe, excepting the UK, has not 
been much better (Eliasson 1997c). The required diversity of competence has not been there 
to guarantee that potential winners are not lost. The improvement in venture capital provision 
for biotech and health care that has been observed recently in Sweden is a larger supply of 
finance channelled through the same very narrow portals of industrial competence as before 
(Eliasson 2000a, 2001b, 2004a). That situation will raise the rate of business failure more 
than the rate of creation and identification of winners. In general it is extremely difficult to 
distinguish between bad projects and long-term winners, which is the task of venture 
                                                 
18 The sequence discovery, company start and break even was 1960-65, 1981 and 1988 in the case of Nobel 
Biocare, and 1981, 1983, 1986 in the case of Acro Med.               
capitalists. This competence requires related industrial experience and, hence, takes a long 
time to develop. Here, the US has an advantage in most of the new industries, since it began 
earlier, and probably also because of a more entrepreneurial culture. The situation is 
somewhat better on the exit or IPO market side. Here, financial market competence matters 
more than the competence to asses industrial potential, since IPOs wait until potential 
industrial performance has been demonstrated. 
 
Åsa Eliasson (2002) investigates the different financing risks involved in going from the 
innovation stage through the entrepreneurial stage and on to industrial scale production. 
Should the innovator/entrepreneur (1) do it alone, slowly, and risk going bankrupt or being 
imitated at an early stage by a big competitor? Should the entrepreneurs  (2) share the risks 
and profits with a venture capitalist to be able to move faster, (3) push further along to be 
acquired at some later stage by a big company, or (4) should he/she opt for safe, but not so 
profitable contract work. To minimize the risk of rejecting winners a viable competence bloc 
should offer all four alternatives. Lack of venture capital competence in Sweden makes (4) a 
common option in Sweden. Opportunities are growing under (3) but to be strategically 
acquired the high-tech firm has to become an innovative entrepreneur in the global markets 
for technology and finance where the big customer firms operate (Eliasson 2001b, c). Such 
markets have been developing in pharmaceutical technology but incentives have narrowed 
because after the many mergers fewer big pharmaceutical companies are competing for 
innovative biotechnology firms (G.Eliasson – Å.Eliasson 2002a). So far, and for some time to 
come Swedish health care will not be exhibiting the viable entrepreneurship it is 
technologically capable of because (mainly) of lacking requisite local venture capital 
competence.  
 
6. Industrialization  phase 
During the industrialization phase winners are moved to industrial scale production and 
distribution. Even though Swedish industry excels in big business leadership (Eliasson 1984, 
1990), its competence base is concentrated to mature industries or industries involving 
mechanical engineering. The experience is that a different industrial competence is needed to 
initiate and build radically new industry, for instance in health services. The industrialization 
phase signifies the ultimate outcome of a successful project selection through the competence 
bloc. But the health care competence bloc is extremely complex, based in a large number of             
technologies (or technological systems; Carlsson 1995) ultimately oriented towards the final 
product of keeping the individual in good health.  
 
6.1  Customer driven innovative organization of health care 
A particular feature of health care, not typical of manufacturing, is the dominance of 
professional specialists. The integrated nature of health products from the diagnostics to the 
treatment stage, often involving the entire competence range for each patient, however, makes 
extreme specialization counterproductive and not rarely produces a chancy outcome. The 
industry, nevertheless, is highly specialized both technically and organizationally making 
suboptimization the rule rather than the exception, a consequence competition has taught 
manufacturing industry to avoid. Thus, for instance, preventive medicine is often discouraged 
because of inconsistent charging systems leading to costly hospitalisation and corrective 
treatment. The immense complexity of health care diagnostics and effective medication has 
confronted European socialized medicine with an immense organizational problem which the 
logic of this essay tells can only be solved in the market. 
 
The family doctor was assigned to be a competent substitute customer, responsible for the 
whole situation of the patient and capable of outsourcing specialist care. The family doctor 
has been rationalized away from large scale Swedish health care. To some extent the private 
insurance companies in the US, including also the HMOs have taken on the economic side of 
that responsibility, being concerned about minimizing the costs of keeping their insured 
clients healthy. These organizations shop competently for health care services that benefit 
both their own and patient interests, for instance by supporting preventive medication to keep 
patients out of costly hospital care. Attempts to enforce ”systemic optimization” through  
centralized bureaucratic management of integrated cooperation among all specialties involved 
often encounter impossible complexity. Many competing private health insurance operators 
driven by economic interests in a rationally distributed organization are far more effective. 
Competition has already forced manufacturing industry to develop competence in distributing 
that allocation over the market. Protected industries exhibit less of that competence and also a 
larger variation in product quality for the same price. 
 
The task of keeping people healthy is a complicated service product involving a large number 
of specialties including the ”specialty of the generalist” who integrates the package of             
specialties relevant for that particular patient. Competence capital embodied in the staff, 
therefore, is the most important technology in health services, the level of technology being, 
as we have shown, very much a matter of the efficient allocation of that competence. The care 
provided depends critically on the skills of the doctor. The consequence, hence, of a bad 
allocation of competence in health industry is a considerable randomness in the provision of 




With the family doctor gone in Sweden the individual has been increasingly left to guide him 
or herself through the large ”industrialized” hospitals, offering hundreds of specialist 
services.
20  Responsibility for the ”whole” of the patient’s health care problem is increasingly 
left with the patient. Since health care efficiency and quality in a large measure lies in the 
ability to assess and attend to that ”whole situation” of the patient the quality of Swedish 
health services has been lowered by standardization and rationalization and a consequent 
reduction in product variation. 
 
6.2  For-profit health care – will competition raise productivity? 
Health care and health insurance have conventionally, notably in Europe, been seen as a 
public, non-commercial responsibility, with the US as an exception. Managed care, for 
instance, provides an interesting private solution in the intersection of health insurance and 
health care, where a company signs up to manage your health. Politicians in Europe, being a 
large part of the substitute customership prevailing there, on the other hand, seem to have 
great difficulties understanding that well organized private health services supplied in 
competitive markets can be both profitable and more efficient and generate better care of 
higher quality than public health care in protected (from competition) markets.  
 
                                                 
19 They find that physicians with top-notch skills would prescribe a more diverse portfolio of drugs than the   
average doctor, a prescription that is optimally selected for the particular patient and illness. Less skilled 
physicians would tend to rely more on what other doctors do, advertising, popularity and ”other low-cost 
sources of information” for their judgment. What is worse, incentives for doctors to invest in understanding 
subtle differences in drug effectiveness vary considerably between insurance systems and ”markets”. 
20 While the large Swedish manufacturing firms have reorganized since the 1970s from large centrally planned 
”machines” to decentralized profit-driven organizations, the protected (from competition) Swedish hospitals are 
still top down planned entities best suited for delivering standardized volume services (see Borgenhammar 1993, 
Borgenhammar and Fallberg 1997 and Fölster et al. 2002).              
While a sizable private for-profit hospitals industry exists in the US, Europe is dominated by 
government-run or regulated health care systems.  Dorsey, Ferrari, Gengos, Hall, Lewis and 
Schetter (1996) compared the treatment of four diseases – diabetes, gallstones, breast and 
lung cancer – in the US, in Germany and in the UK. The US took the lead in productivity, 
despite spending most on health care per capita. Competition explained most of the 
difference. These results are supported by Duggan’s (2000) study on the response of not-for-
profit hospitals to increases in the number of for-profit hospitals in their local market.
21 
Interpreting the data is, however, difficult. Silverman, Skinner and Fisher (1999) have 
compared the medical costs of quality-adjusted health care services in for-profit and not-for-
profit hospitals in the US. They find that for-profit care is significantly more expensive than 
not-for-profit hospital care; and the editor of the New England Journal of Medicine is quick to 
point out (p. 445) that ”the competitive free market described in textbooks does not, and 
cannot exist in health care”. This conclusion is, however, premature. The difference is not that 
great and could easily depend on not yet thought of  measurement errors or selection biases. 
One such error is differences in quality provided, and these are large (see below). Another is 
that hospital care cost measures in Silverman et al. only cover costs per bed which is not a 
good measure of services provided. At least three selection biases creep into such a 
comparison. First, if for-profit hospitals, or doctors referring patients to for-profit hospitals, 
are intensive in their use of preventive care and medication, or in using high-tech treatment to 
keep patients out of hospitals, the for-profit hospitals would receive a disproportionately high 
share of difficult and costly care patients in their beds. This might still be both profitable for 
the for-profit hospitals and for the health care insurer and an efficient allocation of resources. 
Second, the introduction of competition from for-profit hospitals is likely to affect the cost 
performance also of not-for-profit hospitals in the area over the observation period (1989-
1995) and, hence, lower costs through competition also among not-for-profit activities. In a 
dynamically competitive market there should be only negligible differences in costs between 
the two types of hospitals in the long-run. Third, as observed in a recent Swedish study, 
socialized health care with no or little competition among care providers in Canada, England, 
                                                 
21 Duggan uses the change in financial incentives created by California’s Disproportionate Share (DS) program 
and concludes that the presence of for-profit hospitals raises competition through often lower prices in the area 
and make not-for-profit hospitals significantly more responsive to financial incentives in order not to lose 
patients and be hurt financially, in fact taking in more low-income patients now covered by insurance. This, 
however, does not appear to have lowered profitability of hospitals. Possibly, not-for-profit hospitals, by 
behaving ”more like profit-maximizers”,  have been ”able to offset the effects of the greater competition. One 
reason, Duggan suggests, may be that the not-for-profit hospitals have raised the share of physicians on their 
boards and lowered the share of politicians, to act more like the for-profit hospitals.             
Sweden and Denmark shifts costs over to the patient in the form of long waitlists (Fölster, 




Another interesting explanation of the higher costs per bed in for-profit hospitals is that they 
offer a higher quality service (as judged by the patients) on average. The increasing presence 
of health care maintenance organizations (HMOs) has meant a parallel increase in the profit 
motive behind provisions of health care services. Baker and Corts (1995) found that this 
increase has been associated with declining premia for traditional indemnity health insurance. 
Similarly, Cutler and Sheiner (1997) observe that increased managed care significantly 
reduces hospital cost growth. Competition appears to matter for industry performance and 
growth, and competition is moved primarily through new entry (see Table 2). In fact, hospital 
competition appears to improve product quality and lower cost (Kessler and McClellan 2000). 
On this Heidenreich, McClellan, Frances and Baker (2001) report that managed care has 
significantly affected the delivery of medical care in the US partly directly and partly through 
”spillover effects” to fee-for-service insurance patients who reside in areas with highly 
managed care activity and are treated by the same providers.
23   
 
(6.3 Supporting  industries 
Pharmaceuticals are a technological input in hospital care, often substituting for hospital care. 
Biotechnology industry is, in turn, increasingly becoming a technology supplier to the 
pharmaceutical industry, as is laboratory equipment to biotechnology industry. These 
supporting industries are critical for the realization of a higher quality life at the later stages 
of the life cycle. To understand the role of biotechnology in health care provision and the 
                                                 
22 Here McClellan and Staiger (1999a,b) observe that on average for-profit hospitals have higher mortality 
among elderly patients with heart disease than not-for-profit hospitals, but that this can be explained by the fact 
that for-profits tend to locate in areas with higher costs and worse outcomes. Not controlling for these selection 
effects, an error commonly done in literature, the authors observe, makes it appear as if for-profits have higher 
costs. In fact, they observe, they tend to do a little better. 
23 For instance, patients with acute myocardial infarctions, controlling as well as possible for other factors, had a 
relatively high use in areas with high levels of managed care of β-blockers during hospitalization and at 
discharge, and aspirin during hospitalization and at discharge consistent with more appropriate care. On the 
other hand, they were less likely to receive angiography even though this result was only marginally significant. 
This result is, however, compatible with other findings (see e.g. Cutler and McClellan 1996) that increases in 
HMO market share are associated with reductions in the availability of costly medical services. This finding is 
also supported by Baker’s (2000) study of the use of new and expensive magnetic resonance imaging 
equipment. On survival probability there was a small difference favoring areas with high managed care market 
share.             
outcome in terms of improved health, all actors in the competence bloc, including the 
substitute customers who influence the direction of health services, have to be analyzed in 
one organizational context.  
 
Pharmaceutical industry 
The Swedish pharmaceutical industry was long considered much too small for a country 
featuring such an advanced health sector and was often referred to as an example of the bad 
conditions for entrepreneurs in Sweden. Since some 10-20 years the industry has expanded 
rapidly to become internationally large in relation to the country’s GNP and the size of the 
health sector. This expansion, however, depends on two success stories, those of Pharmacia 
and Astra. The stomach ulcer drug Losec, in particular, catapulted Astra from a small 
pharmaceutical company to an internationally large company, and Losec for some time was 
the world’s best selling prescription drug
24. The interesting problem is whether the partial 
withdrawal of  Pharmacia and Astra Zeneca from Sweden means the end of a successful 
industrial development or that the release of advanced innovative competence in the local 
market will open up opportunities for entrepreneurship that were earlier contained within the 
hierarchies of the big companies. Competence bloc analysis would indicate a boom of new 
establishment provided a complete competence bloc is in place. The negative factor would be 
a reduction in competent local customership for the biotech industry. On balance, evidence so 
far  points to a positive long-term growth outcome in the Uppsala region (Eliasson 2004a,b).   
 
Biotechnology industry −  a pure science-based industry 
Biotechnology industry is the only industry of any size founded directly in academic labs (G. 
Eliasson – Å. Eliasson 1996, 1997; Eliasson 2000a, b). In its modern form, it is based on five 
                                                 
24 This illustrates the critical role for growth of identifying winners and moving them on through the competence 
bloc to industrial scale production. Losec (Prilosec in the US) was approved in 1988 and became the world’s 
best selling prescription drug in 1996. Considering its rocky, almost killing road to success Losec, however, 
hardly counts as an entrepreneurial success (G. Eliasson – Å. Eliasson 1997, p. 162). The competitor Tagamet 
was introduced in 1977 by Smithkline, but Tagamet was overcome in 1988 by Zantac (Glaxo) to become the 
world’s best selling prescription drug in 1992. But things move fast. Berndt, Bui, Reiley and Urban (1994) were 
not even aware of the existence of the new competitor substance Losec, approved in 1988 and just about to 
overtake Zantac in its own market. Since the mid 1990s both Astra and Pharmacia have , however, entered the 
global gigantization game of Big Pharma. Astra merged in 1999 with British Zeneca and Pharmacia has gone 
through three mergers, with US UpJohn (1995) and again with Monsanto to emerge in 2000 under its original 
name Pharmacia Corp., only to be acquired by US Pfizer in July 2002.             
methodological discoveries
25 in university laboratories, the invention of two of which have 
been awarded Nobel prizes. The methods are in turn directly based on the Watson and Crick 
(1953) theoretical achievement (Eliasson, Å., 2002). Practically all of this new industry has 
been established in the form of new firms formed around a new idea developed by a group of 
researchers around an ”academic star” who is, as a rule, a well-known academic with many 
publications (Zucker – Darby 1996). During the last few years large biotech competence 
blocs have developed in the Uppsala and Lund/Copenhagen regions, together making Sweden 
one of the most advanced players in this technology. Advanced hospitals and pharmaceutical 
companies have been instrumental in this development as competent and interested 
customers. 
 
Medical and Laboratory Equipment 
Very early on Uppsala University and Pharmacia established a successful cooperation in 
developing laboratory equipment for biotech industry, notably filtering techniques that 
exercised a critical leverage in turning Pharmacia into a global company. Sweden also 
features a number of medical equipment establishments within the medical instrument and 
laboratory equipment industries that have been attracted because of the strong competence 
bloc in that particular area. On the medical instrument side success stories can be observed in 
the intersection between care and medical engineering industry, with Elekta, Gambro, Elema 
(the pace maker)
26 and Pharmacia Amersham
27 as outstanding examples.  
 
Sweden also offers another attractive feature, namely a speedy and efficient drug 
authorization process, well organized statistical patient records for clinical research, and 
excellent facilities at hospitals for clinical testing. Here Sweden has a competitive advantage 
compared to the US, which, for instance, features an excessively cautious and slow 
authorization process that has for long been criticized for being welfare reducing, because the 
                                                 
25 They are: (1) rDNA technology, (2) the use of antibodies, (3) protein engineering and (4) fermentation and 
volume production of biological substances. To this should be added supporting (5) filtering and selection 
laboratory technology. See (Eliasson, Å. 2002) 
26 The pace maker is now part of St Jude Medicals.  
27  Perbio Science – the biotech division of Perstorp- attempted in 199? To acquire Pharmacia Biotech, to sell 
out its large and not very profitable instrument activity to create a global cell culture firm with Sweden as a base. 
It did not work out and there were no other potential mates in Sweden. In 2003 Perbio Science , now a listed 
company , was acquired at a  high price by US Fisher Scientific. Pharmacia Biotech  merged in XXXX with UK 
Amersham into Pharmaci9a Amnersham, changed its name to Amersham Biosciencies, only to be acquired in 
2003 by US General Electric.             
benefits from an earlier arrival of new substances might dominate over the risks for undesired 
side effects (Pelzman 1973). This supply of superior services has attracted foreign 
pharmaceutical companies to Sweden
28.)  
 
7.  Comparison of Swedish and US health industry performance 
                                                 
28 On this Azoulay (2003)  observes that “ information is acquired more easily within and across firm 
boundaries”. Hence, “ knowledge intensive projects are more likely to be assigned to internal teams, while data-
intensive projects “ such as clinical testing are more likely to be outsourced. Even though the term “tacit 
knowledge” and Polanyi (1966) is referred to in passing and in a less relevant context, Azoulay has difficulties 
with the  standard economic terminology which makes no distinction between knowledge and information. What 
Azoulay really demonstrates is that tacit knowledge is mnore easily transferred within firms than between firms 
but that coded knowledge or information and data-intensive activities can be monitored across firm boundaries.               
Despite a dramatic reduction in resources (in percent of GNP) spent on health care, 
Sweden still has one of the world’s most advanced health (hospital) care systems featuring a 
number of world known specialties. The award of the Nobel prize in medicine has made the 
Karolinska Institute world famous. Sweden still also features the perhaps most advanced 
supply of dental services in the world (Arvidsson and Jönsson 1991). As a consequence 
Culyer et al (1995) having studied the centralized and publicly administered  Swedish system 
sympathetically entitled their book ”Swedish Health Care – best in the world?” At the same 
time the presentation of US health care in Arvidsson and Jönsson (1991) focused critically on 
its base in individual responsibility , incomplete insurance coverage and cost inflation – the 
moral being that there was not much to learn for Sweden.  While technology and availability 
of highly competent substitute customers (the hospitals) are still plentiful in Sweden, from our 
perspective and  from there on conditions and incentives to transform the sector into a 
competitive industry appear missing.  Health care provisions are regulated, large scale, 
standardized and heavily subsidized and the system discourages innovative product 
competition. Even though changes allowing for more variations have been instituted recently, 
there is not much to learn by studying differences between Swedish health care providers 
when it comes to critical factors in the industrialization process. The situation is not much 
different in the rest of Europe. In the US, on the other hand, differences in approaches are 
much greater making the US health care competence bloc fundamentally more innovative 
than the European health care systems. A much larger part of health care than in Europe, and 
notably in Sweden is supplied through the market. Hence, a comparison between the US and 
Sweden offers the needed interesting contrast, while Europeans and Swedes have little to 
learn by looking at each other.  
 
7.1  Health insurance and managed care in the US – a new health care product? 
Compared to Europe, the US health care market offers a great variety of services. Above all, 
health insurance and care often come as an integrated package. The insurer, therefore, plays a  
different role as substitute customer than in Europe and an active role. At one  extreme some 
15 percent of the US population, mostly unemployed, has no health insurance
29. There is a 
                                                 
29 See Cutler and Zeckhauser 1999, p. 7 and Perry – Rosen 2001. Non-employment and self-employment are the 
main reasons for not being covered by health insurance. Some of the uninsured (perhaps 4 percent) have chosen 
not to take up an insurance they are eligible for. Hospitals are required to provide ”uncompensated” care in well 
defined cases, notably emergency treatment. In addition to that state imposed minimum requirements of ” 
Cadillac coverage” and health insurance in some states not only raise the cost of insurance for individuals but 
also make employers that would be willing to offer ”bare bones” insurance abstain, and offer no insurance at all             
variety of pure health insurance contracts and combinations of insurers and providers. At the 
other extreme insurers and providers form a single entity.
30  Managed care by a large number 
of competing Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) and Preferred Provider 
Organizations (PPOs) may be what comes closest in practice to a service defined to maintain 
a certain agreed upon quality of life.  
 
The HMOs and the PPOs are the most important providers, but the more recent Independent 
Practice Associations (IPA) or Network Model HMOs are an innovation in that they do not 
employ their own physicians or run their own hospitals, but rather outcontract to local 
providers. PPOs consist of teams of physicians who run HMO type organizations. They are 
often linked to private insurance plans, and offer private family solutions. In addition, the US 
offers a Swedish type medicare program for all above 65, and a low benefit medicaid program 
for the poor. Furthermore, many people below 65 who are not very poor (then they are 
covered by medicaid) and unemployed or self-employed seem to have chosen voluntarily to 
be without health insurance. However, as mentioned , health care costs in the US are to some 
extent tax deductible. It can therefore be said that the US health care market offers a variety 
of customized health insurance/care solutions compared to the uniform standard offered in 
Sweden. The real customer (the potential patient) has a broad choice in the US compared to 
no choice in Sweden, and the market of combined insurance and care has all the 
characteristics of an innovative experimental market. HMO enrollment of all forms has 
increased significantly, from 8 percent of the population in 1980 to nearly half of the privately 
insured population today (Cutler and Zeckhauser 1999). The fact that private health insurance 
in the US is predominantly provided through the employment relationship and regulated at the 
state level (Gruber 1992) explains this variation in health care solutions, compared to the 
vaguely expressed standardized contracts offered by nationalized schemes in Europe. The 
consequences of this industry dynamics have been far reaching and forced a restructuring of 
the hospitals as well. Hospitals in the US have gone through a merger movement similar to 
that in other industries and it is still an open question if the outcome has been all that good. 
One problem, however, that relates directly to our definition of the health services product is 
that none of the HMOs take on a contracted responsibility beyond a year or so, and practically 
                                                                                                                                                          
(Gruber 1992). According to the 1991 Economic Report to the President (p. 141) as much as one-quarter of non-
insurance is due to state regulation.  
30 For an overview see Cutler and Zeckhauser (1999).             
all are employer-funded and relate to the customer through a standard (for all, or groups of 
employees of the firm) benefit contract. 
31 
The nature of the health insurance contract influences the demand for health services. The 
causal links are, however, tricky to sort out. Meer-Rosen (2003) conclude that insurance is 
associated with greater utilization of health services , but that this does not necessarily mean 
that insurance leads to better health. However, insurance coverage appears to raise the 
demand for preventive care procedures. The fall in health insurance coverage in the 1990s in 
the US can be explained by increased costs to employees (Cutler 2002). However, the often 
advocated solution to subsidize employer-provided health insurance premiums may not be a 
good solution. Gruber-Washington (2003) found that the after-tax elasticity of insurance take 
up
32 was small and did not  induce much of an additional insurance take up, but rather induced 
those which already were covered  to select more expensive plans and thus primarily raised 
Government health care expenditures
33. 
In general Remler-Zivin- Glied (2002) demonstrate through simulation that the consequences 
of policies to expand health insurance are quite complex, very sensitive to the specification of 
the models used and, hence difficult to predict. This “ undermines effective policy making” 
the authors conclude. 
An even more serious concern is the macro economic effects of such policies. Health 
insurance in the US normally comes as an ingredient and an attractive part of the job contract. 
From their survey of literature Gruber-Madrian (2002) conclude that health insurance is a 
central determinant of retirement and labor supply decisions, notably the supply decisions of 
secondary earners. Relate that to Prescott´s (2004) results that much of the 50 percent larger 
per capita labor supply in the US compared to Europe can be explained by lower taxes, and in 
addition, I am inclined to add overly generous social security and health insurance benefits 
                                                 
31 Tax subsidized health insurance by the employer has increased group insurance, notably among union 
members and employed persons (Thomasson 2000). In contrast to Sweden health care costs in the US are to 
some extent deductible (against income).  In some cases the individual has the opportunity to buy (privately) 
special benefits. It is, however, very unusual and quite costly to design and pay privately for your own family 
health care plan. Here Gruber and Madrian (1995) found that uninsured (notably non-employed) were very 
sensitive to limited subsidization of the cost of insurance. 
32 of such subsidies to postal employees in 1994 and to all Federal employees in 2000 
33 Analysing Canadian data Smart-Stabile (2003) conclude that Canadians who can deduct the cost of health care 
and health insurance from their private income have been quite responsive to changes in the tax price of health 
care. The  delay in capturing the benefits, furthermore, does not seem to matter that much . A lowering of the tax 
price of healthcare, as should be expected , appears to increase spending on health care but reduce spending on 
health insurance. One should also expect that the incidence of employer provided health insurance will be on the 
employee in terms of lower wages, as econometrically documented on Japanese data in Komamura-Yamadsa 
(2004).             
that reduce incentives to work. Since in the long-run those benefits are largely underfunded, 
and cannot be financed through higher taxes a looming potential crisis of the European 
welfare economies can easily be conjured up. 
 
7.2  The Swedish experience 
The US health care industry was the largest (as a share of GNP) in the world 1983 and has 
increased since then. Swedish care came in second but has dropped significally (see Table 3). 
To judge from the price studies referred to, the volume (including quality) of health care 
services provided to US citizens has increased even more than the cost. Even though the  
Swedish drop may be exaggerated because of some statistical reclassifications
34, it is still very 
large. The ways Swedish health care is organized, furthermore, suggest that the quality 
increases benefiting US citizens may not benefit Swedish citizens, and for reasons explained 
below. The reduction in Swedish health care expenditures, furthermore, have all been 
mandated by political decisions. The public part of US health care expenditures (6.5 percent 
of GNP in 1997) was almost as large as public health care expenditures in Sweden the same 
year (7.2 percent in Table 3), and in the US both private and public health care provisions 
have increased as a percentage of GNP. Since GNP per capita is higher in the US than in 
Sweden the average Swede receives less in terms of $ worth of public health care than the 
average US citizen. The above mentioned price-quality analysis gives no reason to believe 
that the US health care services were less efficiently delivered. On the contrary, the US 
citizens receive significant high quality, life quality enhancing health care that the Swedish 
citizens do not receive. Similarly, except for the political problem of non-insurance in the US, 
there is no reason to believe that public health care expenditures are less fairly allocated in the 
US than in Sweden. 
 
The reduction in health care provisions in Sweden is unique for the wealthy industrial 
countries (see Table 3), but not as extreme as when compared with the US. It may very well 
                                                 
34 Part of this lowering is said to be attributable to an increased efficiency in hospital care, but the same then has 
to be true for the US. Another, more unique (for Sweden) reason is a lowering of relative wages in the hospital 
care sector notably of high quality staff  (which might signal a longer term reduction in the quality of care), and 
a change in statistical classification that means that part of the costs for the caring of the elderly has been taken 
out of the health care accounts. Finally, and most important, appears to be the reduction of public spending on 
health care (see Eliasson 1997b, p. 34) and a reduced capacity, resulting instead in the longer wait lists for 
medical service, typical of socialized health care protected from competition.             
reflect the relative decrease in standard of living the Swedes have experienced since the mid-
1970s, an interpretation quite in keeping with Erik Höök’s (1962) above mentioned 
observation. 
 
[The recent privatization of care, notably in emergency care, and the opening up of the market 
for some competition (see, for instance, Öhrming and Sverke 2001) has stirred the political 
debate but has also revealed the same kind of benefits and problems that have long been 
observed, discussed and researched in the US.  Privatization of some hospitals and homes for 
the elderly has loosened up regulations somewhat. Since the mid-1980s increased freedom to 
organize the production of health services has been given to the country council districts, but 
in health insurance standard national principles apply. The public hospitals cannot generally 
provide privately paid for treatment. A few private hospitals can receive privately paying 
patients but if they want something beyond standard treatment or faster service it is not 
covered by the national-public insurance. They have to pay the whole cost, not only the extra 
cost. Hence, such extra service in practice is only available to the very rich or to top 
executives whose companies value their health so high that they pay. Hence, incentives to 
provide new innovative health services are missing. Incentives in Swedish health care 
stimulate process cost reductions for given health care products. Such reductions are achieved 
through standardization, rationalization and economies of scale in larger production units and 




8.  Transforming public Swedish Health service into an internationally 
competitive industry 
The base problems of this essay have been industrial, or how to transform a publicly provided 
non-market service into a market based industry. We have observed that the three most 
pronounced changes in health care markets are (a) a dramatic increase in the share of the 
elderly (65+) in the population of the rich industrial nations, (b) a widening of income and 
wealth distributions and (c) that the biotechnology revolution will make dramatic quality of 
life improvements possible, quite possibly even at the expense of further extensions of life, 
the latter being the major achievement of health care in the 20
th century. The consequence 
will be a corresponding surge in demand. Innovative product development and             
entrepreneurship will, therefore, characterize a successful, transforming and developing 
health industry. 
 
Transferring the Swedish health care public service sector into an internationally competitive 
industry involves reorganizing the entire production system in Figure 1, not only parts of it, 
into a market based industry. This notably involves the health insurance and care sectors. 
Insurers and care providers act as sophisticated and competent customers and are critical for 
the transformation process, even though the diminishing resource inputs in recent years have 
influenced that position negatively compared to the rest of the industrial world. On the state 
of Swedish health industry we have observed six things. First, adjusted for size Sweden 
appears to occupy a technologically  leading position in Europe when it comes to all the 
technologies needed (Figure 1) to make up a complete health industry. That technological 
leadership originates in a lucky combination of industrial and medical technology, but above 
all in early and generous spending on medical services and the development of a base of 
sophisticated customers (“ the hospitals”). As resources devoted to medical service provision 
have been reduced and ideological fundamentalism characterized the organization of health 
care this leadership position is, however, being gradually compromised. Second, Sweden 
suffers from the ”European problem” in two ways. The substitute customership imposed 
through socialized health insurance and regulation has created a ”market” environment that 
discourages entrepreneurship based on innovative product development. Third, socialization 
of the care sector has meant centralization and the development of large-scale standardized 
care which runs counter to the personalised services research indicates will be a reality in the 
future. Fourth, Sweden lacks the downstream (in the competence bloc) competence, notably 
venture capital competence needed to commercialize the technology. Hence, both the 
incentives and the competencies needed to exploit the opportunities industrially, notably 
through new firm entry, are lacking and potential commercial winners tend to be locked up as 
”technologies” or relocated abroad. Fifth, health care is generally thought of as a regulated 
public service or responsibility, and rarely as a market based  industry. Innovative advanced 
provisions of medical service to an exclusive group of customers willing to pay, being 
instrumental for the development of  advanced product technology  elsewhere is effectively 
blocked through socialist insurance and regulation. Sixth, and finally, you are not supposed to 
earn money on the caring for the sick, and law, regulations and medical practice have seen to 
it that it is difficult to become rich in an extremely conservative care business in Europe.              
 
In conclusion then, even though Swedes have the necessary upstream requisites of 
sophisticated technology and advanced customers it lacks the downstream commercial and 
industrial competence to turn the upstream advantages into an internationally competitive 
industry. And time is running out. The reduced spending on health care in Sweden will soon 
cut the current advantage in technology and competent customers and technology will be 
economically induced to reallocate abroad. 
 
[These problems Sweden, however, shares with the other European countries, all lagging 
behind the US which is unique when it comes to allowing its health care to function as a 
market based industry. Europe has political difficulties recognizing health care as a potential 
industry characterized by innovative product development that may become both more 
efficient and profitable when reorganized in dynamically competitive markets. If European 
countries do not act rationally on the facts of  increasingly costly health care sectors, facing 
increasing demands from an aging society they will certainly encounter a devastating fiscal 
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Table 1.   Actors in the competence bloc 
1.  Competent and active customers 
2.  Innovators who integrate technologies in new ways 
3.  Entrepreneurs who identify profitable innovations 
4.  Competent venture capitalists who recognize and finance the entrepreneurs   
5.  Exit markets that facilitate ownership change 
6. Industrialists  who take successful innovations to industrial scale production  





Table 2.    The four mechanisms of Schumpeterian creative destruction and economic 
growth 
1.   Innovative entry 
      enforces (through competition) 
2.   Reorganization 
3.   Rationalization 
or 
4.   Exit (shut down) 
Source: ”Företagens, institutionernas och marknadernas roll i Sverige”, Appendix 6 in A. Lindbeck (ed.), Nya 
villkor för ekonomi och politik /SOU 1993:16) and G. Eliasson (1996a, p. 45, 2001a).  38 
Table 3.   Health care costs as a share of GNP 1983, 1993 and 1996   
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